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Computing Electoral Districts  
Michel Balinski 
CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique, Paris 
 
Short Abstract 
 
Political gerrymandering is the practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly 
irregular shape, to favor one political party. New technology has turned the amateurish efforts of the past into 
precise gerrymandering tools that can seriously subvert an electorate’s intent (and have). This talk will explain 
why, and how, and what can be done about it. 
 
Extended abstract 
On April 28, 2004 the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer. It 
refused to declare unconstitutional Pennsylvania’s new map of 19 congressional districts (based on the census of 
2000, first used in the 2002 elections). Its bizarrely shaped districts have been compared to animals: the “supine 
seahorse” and the “upside-down Chinese dragon.” By all accounts Pennsylvania slightly favors the Democratic 
Party. In the elections of 2000 (when the state had 21 seats) it elected 11 Republicans and 10 Democrats (while 
giving Gore 50.6% and Bush 46.4% in the state-wide vote); in 2002, with the new map, it elected 12 
Republicans and 7 Democrats (while giving a Democratic gubernatorial candidate 55% in the state-wide vote). 
Five Republican candidates ran unopposed, one Democratic candidate ran unopposed. The map “kidnapped” 
three Democratic incumbents; it  systematically “cracked” Democratic voters among districts; and “packed” and 
“stacked” them into districts. Yet the map is “perfect”: every district has either 646,371 or 646,372 inhabitants. 
Not one Justice denied that the map is a blatant political gerrymander (“the practice of dividing a geographical 
area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by 
diluting the opposition’s voting strength”).  
Texas, with its new congressional map, elected 17 Democratic and 15 Republican Representatives in 
2002, and also gave absolute political control of the State government to the Republicans. The new State 
government immediately redrew the map of the congressional districts. It is widely agreed that in the 2004 
elections Texas will elect 10 Democrats (perhaps 9) and 22 (perhaps 23) Republicans. Yet every district has 
either 651,619 or 651,620 inhabitants. Gerrymandering is perfectly ecumenical: the Democrats believe in it as 
much as their Republican brethren. In Maryland the map drawn by the Democrats changed what had been an 
equal division of the seats into a 6 to 2 split to their advantage and deliberately eliminated a targeted incumbent. 
In Georgia the Democrat’s map increased their congressional delegation by two and successfully “kidnapped” a 
manager of the effort to impeach President Clinton (despite the loss of one Senator and the governorship in state-
wide races). California’s map is bipartisan … yet suspect: 50 of 53 Representatives including every incumbent 
candidate was elected with at least 60% of the votes in 2002. 
These instances, and others, have provoked a public outcry: district maps determine the winners, not 
elections! 
Why and how has this happened? First, Supreme Court decisions have set precedents that are confused 
and often contradictory. Second, new computer technology has permitted maps and their political implications to 
be defined easily and quickly. Third, the increasingly predictable behavior of voters has made the political 
implications of district lines more accurate.  
In the opinion of the plurality (four of nine) in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, claims of partisan 
gerrymandering should be “nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating such claims exist.” Their reason (if not their reasoning) is sound: there is no theory or body of 
knowledge capable of distinguishing which of two district maps is “fairer.” If single-member constituencies are 
to remain in use (and they exist in many countries) then a central problem in the mathematics of political 
systems is to develop rigorous criteria for “fair districting” … or to show that it is impossible to do so.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling and opinion will no doubt open the floodgates, provoking new 
gerrymanders wherever one of the two parties has absolute political control of the State. A swing of as much as 
5% of the vote from the Republicans to the Democrats is already expected to result in practically no increase of 
Democratic representation. A major crisis threatens the democratic institutions of the nation. 
The judicial system has proved itself incapable of providing relief. Congress has the constitutional right 
to impose a fair electoral system. What should the Congress do? The problem is at once urgent and important. 
This talk will outline the problem in the context of the current situation in the United 
States, and will advance several tentative answers.  
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1. Why the problem is urgent and important 
 
The French Assemblée Nationale : 
 
Apportionment and districting date from 1986 
(based on census of 1982). Based on 1999 census : 
 
 
 population députés 
Haute-Garonne 1 046 338 8 
Moselle 1 023 447 10 
 
(47 such “reversals) 
 
 
 
 average 
population 
 
inequality 
25  most populated 
départements (>50% pop) 
112 123 
25 least populated 
départements 79 043 
41.9% 
 
 
 
 Population inequality 
2e circ. Lozère 34 374 
2e circ. Val-de-Marne 188 200 448% 
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Within le Var : 
 
 Population inequality 
2e circonscription 73 946 
6e circonscription 180 153 144% 
 
 
The US House of Representatives : 
 
 
2002 election (435 Representatives) : 
• 386 candidates were incumbents : exactly 4 
defeated by outsiders 
• 81 candidates unopposed 
• 338 incumbents re-elected with  >60% of votes 
• Representatives :  
                        <10% elected with <60% of votes 
   Candidates state-wide (“natural districts”) : 
                          50% elected with <60% of votes 
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• In California : 50 (of 53) candidates elected                                            
with >60% of votes  
• Widely believed that 400 of the 435 seats are 
“safe” 
 
2000 election : 
 
          Gore : 50 999 897       Bush : 50 456 002 
 
 
Suppose the Electoral College gave 1 vote to that 
candidate having the most votes in each  
congressional district (as defined in 2002). The 
outcome would have been : 
 
          Gore : 198                Bush : 237 
  
Their proportional shares : 
 
          Gore : 219                 Bush : 216 
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Gerrymandering Pennsylvania :  
 
Political gerrymandering is “the practice of 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, 
often of highly irregular shape, to give one 
political party an unfair advantage by diluting the 
opposition’s voting strength.” ( Black’s Law 
Dictionary (1999)) 
 
Population : 12 291 054 
Congressional districts : 19 (down from 19) 
Counties : 67 
Voting precincts : 9 427 
Census tracts : 322 424 (avg. persons/tract = 38) 
First district plan : 
A frank and open gerrymander for the Republicans 
3 Democratic incumbents “kidnapped” 
Democrats systematically “cracked” and “packed” 
 
 7 
84 local governments split (25 counties and 59 
        cities, boroughs or townships)  
6 voting precincts split 
Montgomery County : split 6 ways 
Largest district : 646 380  
Smallest district : 646 361 
 
Result in 2002 elections :  
        Republicans: 12 (before 11)  
        Democrats : 7 (before 10) 
        Democrats win in state-wide races 
 
Court case Vieth v. Jubelirer  in Federal District 
Court :  
         No to charge of partisan gerrymandering 
         Yes to charge not as equal as possible 
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Second district plan : 
 
Extremely minor adjustments – new districts 
      contain 99.34% of inhabitants of old districts 
110 local governments split (29 counties and 81 
        cities, boroughs or townships)  
 
Largest district : 646 372  
Smallest district : 646 371 
 
1 person difference : How was this done ! ? : 
 
        “Caliper’s Maptitude for Redistricting” 
 
Technology has created a fundamental change in  
the practice of democracy : it may well be 
impossible to devise a set of criteria for 
determining what is a fair districting plan and what 
is not.  
 
Districting determines winners, not voters ! 
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2. Why the impasse ? 
 
In France : 
 
Momentum, cynicism, politics, an excessively shy 
Conseil Constitutionnel. The law calls for a 
reapportionment and redistricting after every 
second census : today’s Assemblée determined on 
the basis of census of 1982, yet censuses 
conducted in 1990 and 1999. 
  
In the United States :  
  
History; and US Supreme Court decisions that are 
confused and often contradictory. 
 
Judge Felix Frankfurter’s statement (1946), 
“Courts ought not to enter this political thicket,” 
prevailed …. until the spread between rural over-
representation and urban under-representation 
became too blatant, and the Kennedy 
administration supported reform. 
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Baker v. Carr (1962). Tennessee legislature : 
       2 340 person district elected 2 representatives 
     25 316     --         --          --     2           -- 
   312 345     --         --          --     7           -- 
 
The Court gave little guidance, but opened the 
floodgates of litigation attacking situations. Chief 
Justice Earl Warren called it “the most important 
case [of my] tenure on the Court.” 
 
Wesberry v. Sanders, February 1964.  “… as 
nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another’s.” 
 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, April 1969.  “ …the ‘as 
nearly as practicable’ standard requires that the 
State make a good faith effort to achieve precise 
mathematical equality.” 
 
Karcher v. Daggett, June 1983. New Jersey’s 
redistricting did not meet the standard : 
Largest : 527 472                   Smallest : 523 798 
                      Inequality :  0.7% 
 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, April 2002, District Court : a 
difference of 19 persons does not meet it either. 
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Other historical forces were at work too.  
 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 finally assured 
Blacks the legal possibility of voting … but not the 
possibility of being elected themselves. 
 
In 1982 it was reinforced : electoral procedures 
could not dilute the votes of minorities defined by 
race, color or language. This allowed the creation 
of  “majority-minority” districts … and promoted 
the “unholy alliance” between Black Democrats 
and White Republicans (and the Republican 
successes in the 1992 elections) … and very 
strange districts indeed !  
 
Davis v. Bandemer, June 1986. A cohesive 
political group – like a racial minority – could be 
protected from a dilution of its votes, but actual 
and intended discrimination had to be established, 
and the criterion “seats in proportion to votes” is 
not a constitutional principle. 
 
These and other cases were typically controversial 
and decided by close votes.  
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Throughout, members of the Supreme Court (in 
majority and minority opinions) tussled with 
criteria or standards by which to judge when a 
district plan is constitutional and when not … other 
than the obvious “good faith effort to achieve 
precise mathematical equality” among the 
populations of the districts.  
 
Districting plans should (for some judges, 
sometimes should not) : 
 
• have connected districts 
• have compact districts 
• have frontiers agreeable to the eye 
• conform to traditional political, or 
administrative frontiers 
• respect communities of common interest 
• protect incumbents 
• be judged not as a total plan but on the basis of 
single districts 
• be judged by the process by which they were 
devised …. 
• not dilute the votes of identifiable minorities or 
of identifiable cohesive political groups 
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• not be evaluated on the basis of  “seats in 
proportion to votes” of any group, which is not 
a constitutional principle, so not germane to 
determining dilution – such judgements 
depend on “the totality of the circumstances” 
 
But while “segregating voters on the basis of race 
is not a lawful one, … the fact [is] that partisan 
districting is a lawful and common practice” 
 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, April 2004, Supreme Court. 
Four of the majority of five judges that decided 
Bush v. Gore in December 2000 signed the 
plurality decision written by A. Scalia :  
 
“Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation 
have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of 
principled application. We would therefore 
overrule that case, and decline to adjudicate these 
political gerrymandering claims.”  
 
The fifth agreed … but hoped criteria will 
eventually be found.  
 
The judicial system has failed. 
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In the United States of today there is nothing that 
can stop the legislature of a state to district in any 
way they like … so long as the populations of the 
districts are as nearly equal as possible. 
 
 
Texas 2002. Redistricted in 2000, results in the 
2002 election : 
 
Democrats : 17                            Republicans : 15 
 
In elections of 2002 : both Houses and the 
governorship of the State became Republican. 
They have redistricted.  
 
Predicted result in 2004 : 
 
Democrats : 10 (or 9)        Republicans : 22 (or 23) 
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3. What can be done 
 
The districting problem 
 
• A map of indecomposable units, called  
• cantons (in  France ; or communes, 
municipalities, precincts …),  
• their populations, and  
• the number n of districts in the département 
(state or region). 
 
A district is a subset of cantons that constitute a 
connected region.  
 
Imagine a jigsaw puzzle, one piece for each 
canton, whose “weight” is the population of the 
canton.  
 
The problem is to assemble the pieces into n 
separate sets of connected pieces that are “as 
nearly as possible of equal” total weight.  
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This is the problem as defined by the French 
electoral law of 1986 (still standing ... and 
unchanged in its solution) ; plus the stricture that 
“differences in the populations of the districts are 
allowed to satisfy imperatives in the general public 
interest” but cannot deviate from the average of the 
département by more than 20%. 
 
But   20% over  +  20% under = 50% difference 
because : 
average = 100 000  
implies 
80 000 and 120 000 are tolerated, and 
120 000 ÷ 80 000 = 1.5 
 
(just as in Bavaria 15% + 15% = 35.3%). 
 
Usually, also, there is a popular expectation of 
districts that are – in some sense – compact. 
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Model 1 :  
 
Each canton is assigned a geographical center. 
 
The computation : 
 
• Chooses n district centers, and  
• assigns every canton to exactly one center, 
thereby defining n districts. 
 
Calculates each district’s  
 
• population : the sum of the populations of each 
of its cantons, and  
• dispersion : the sum of the distances of each of 
its cantons from the district center weighted by 
the canton’s population,  
 
then chooses the centers and assigns the cantons to 
them so that  
 
• district populations are within 3% of the ideal 
• the sum of all district dispersions is a 
minimum. 
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Le Var : 43 cantons, 7 députés 
 
 
Districts Actual population Computed population 
1e  73 946 122 247 
2e 86 693 128 574 
3e 144 595 122 593 
4e 143 492 131 507 
5e 132 397 128 127 
6e 180 153 132 951 
7e  137 165 132 397 
inégalité 143.6% 8.8% 
 
 
 
Mesure of inequality : 180 153 ÷ 73 946 = 2.436 
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Model 3. Partisan-free districting 
 
Idea : A member of the French Assemblée 
nationale (or of the US House of 
Representatives) represents his/her single 
district and his/her département (or State). 
 
Accordingly : 
 
The total vote of a party in a département (or 
State) determines the total number of its 
elected candidates (by the method of d’Hondt, 
to favor big political parties).
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“The operations of political arithmetic aim at achieving 
useful research in the art of governing people  … One 
may with ease conceive that from such discoveries, and 
many others …, obtained from calculations based on 
certain well founded experiments, a skilled minister 
would draw a mass of useful conclusions … But often 
ministers (I dare not say without exception) believe they 
have no need to tire themselves with combinations and 
series of arithmetic operations: some imagine 
themselves gifted with a powerful natural genius that 
dispenses them from a course so long and painful … 
Nevertheless, if the nature of the business demanded 
and permitted it, I have no doubt that we would 
convince ourselves that the political world, just as the 
physical world, may be regulated in many respects by 
weight, number and measure ” 
Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet 
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Bergen County (New Jersey), 1970. 
(67 municipalities partitioned into 5 connected districts with one goal : to minimize the differences in 
populations.) 
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Spektabiles,
sehr geehrter Herr Prorektor,
hohe Festversammlung,
liebe Damen Balinska Junior,
und – last but eigentlich first – verehrter Kollege Michel Balinski,
soon to become Doctor rerum naturalium honoris causa Universitatis Augustanae.
Soon, in spe, it is my pleasure to emphasize, because Spektabiles Jungnickel will bestow
the honorary degree on you only when, or shall I say: if, I have come to an end with
my laudatio, which has barely even begun.
In fact, right away we are facing a certain problem. In case that of the many
achievements of Professor Balinski there were too many or, mathematically speaking,
infinitely many, my laudatio would never ever come to an end, and Professor Balinski
would have to wait for the honorary degree infinitely long. Luckily, Michel Balinski
distinguished himself in a subfield of mathematics that goes unter the name of discrete
mathematics, and that is characterized by dealing with finitely many items and finite
sets. Hence, my dear Michel, I am confident that you will tolerate my saying that of
your lasting achievements there are finitely many.
Since all good things come in threes, I shall concentrate, firstly, on your contributions to
linear and to combinatorial optimization, secondly, on your contributions to discrete
model building and, thirdly, on your contributions to the analysis of proportional
representation systems. To begin with, however, I would like to introduce you to the
audience as a human being, by telling a little bit from your vita, and to introduce us
to you, by reviewing parts of the short history of our Institute.
E-Mail: Pukelsheim@Math.Uni-Augsburg.De · Internet: www.uni-augsburg.de/pukelsheim
– 2 –
Michel Balinski: Vita
Michel Balinski was born some seventy years ago, in Geneva, into a polyglott family.
His father being occupied by his position as a Polish diplomat with the League of
Nations, much of Michel’s education laid in the hands of his grandparents. In fact,
his grandfather was Ludwik Rajchman (1881-1965) who, then, was the Director of
the League of Nations’ Health Organization and, later, in December 1946, became the
founder of Unicef, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund.
The Geneva start was followed by a few years in France which, fleeing from the invading
German troops, ended in the exodus, via Lisbon, to the US. In the New World his
mother was to continue to speak to him in French, thus helping the child to maintain
the French roots.
Michel, having grown up outside New York City, spent most of his formative years and
his academic career on the East coast. In 1954 he graduated fromWilliams College with
a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics, followed by a Master’s Degree in Economics from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, in 1959, a PhD degree in Mathematics
from Princeton University.
The academic affiliations of Michel Balinski include Princeton University, the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania, the City University of New York, Yale
University, and the State University of New York at Stony Brook. The latter ran in
parallel with a position of a Directeur de Recherche with the CNRS and the Laboratoire
d’Econome´trie of the Ecole Polytechnique. Over time the double appointment across
the Atlantic proved too much of a burden. Hence in 1989 Michel Balinski moved
permanently to the Ecole Polytechnique, and this is the position from which he retired
to the status of emeritus, in 1999.
In the French system – other than in the German system, I enviously add – there is also
a life after retirement, of which Michel Balinski has made and is still making good use,
in his position as a Directeur de Recherche de classe exceptionnelle e´me´rite´. Judging
from the rate of output of papers, attendance of conferences, and other academic
activities I am happy to report that Professor Balinski must be alive and well.
In the forty years of professional career Michel Balinski distinguished himself with
an exceptional number of successful activities beyond what a Professor normally is
paid for, research and teaching. He founded the journal Mathematical Programming,
which became a leading journal of the field. He served as president of professional
societies, visited an impressive number of international universities as a guest lecturer,
and served as the System and Decision Sciences Chairman of IIASA, the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxemburg near Wien. In 1965 Balinski
was awarded the prestiguous Lanchester Prize of the Operations Research Society of
America, which is a particular pleasure to mention since the Augsburg Mathematics
Faculty includes with Karl-Heinz Borgwardt another Lanchester Prize winner.
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Augsburg: Anwendungsorientierte Mathematik
Thus having innoccuously found our way to Augsburg, let us stay here for a while.
Founded by the Romans, the city of Augsburg looks back on more than 2000 years of
history. In the middle ages, Augsburg was the premier banking place of the Old World,
a place you would necessarily turn to, if you wanted to be elected emperor and were
in need of a few thousands, or hundred thousands, of Gulden to bribe your electors.
Strangely, though, the bourgeois elite of the Freie Reichsstadt never contemplated
investing their money in a University.
We therefore have to admit that the University is less of a product of Augsburg’s
glorious past. Rather, founded in 1970, it is more of a political reaction to the post-68
syndrome. Which, on the other hand, makes the University a young lady, crispy and
attractive.
When, in 1981, mathematics was added to the growing University, the challenge was
to develop an image which would convey to the general public the idea of how modern,
useful, and profitable mathematics is, both in the real world that we live in, as well as
the complex world that we think in. The challenge was met by letting the Augsburg
Mathematics Institute sail under the heading of anwendungsorientierte Mathematik,
and this strategic orientation has proved to be extremely successful since.
It is difficult to properly translate anwendungsorientierte Mathematik into English.
Applied mathematics would be too narrow, besides being already confined to
the connotation of Angewandte Mathematik and, inappropriately, suggesting a
contraposition with Pure Mathematics. I am afraid I cannot do better than
translating anwendungsorientierte Mathematik rather literally into application oriented
mathematics which, indeed, embraces abstract research such as pure mathematics,
while at the same time prominently emphasizes the practical use to which mathematics
is put.
Under the label anwendungsorientierte Mathematik a novel degree in Wirtschafts-
mathematik was devised and was then, and still is today, the curriculum that
most of our students choose to enroll in. In 1981 there was only a handful of
mathematics departments at German universities offering such a degree. With the
success saga spreading this has changed, and we have lost our unique position. The
anwendungsorientierte concept carried not only beyond Augsburg to other campusses.
On this campus, it also carried beyond mathematics to other fields. It provided an
extremely fruitful starting point for the Augsburg Physics Department and, as of
recently, of the Computer Science Department. The current strategic plan of the
University provides some renewed visibility for the concept, by presenting it under the
timely label of innovative technologies.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have reviewed part of the University history on this occasion,
of conferring an honorary PhD degree on Michel Balinski, because he and his scientific
œuvre testify in a prime way that the anwendungsorientierte interplay, of real world
problems and complex academic solutions, is fascinating, fruitful, and never ending.
As mentioned in the beginning, I will exemplify this claim by marking three of the
fields where Balinski’s scientific achievements stand out.
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Contributions to linear and to combinatorial optimization
Balinski’s 1959 Princeton PhD thesis, directed by Albert W. Tucker, was entitled
An Algorithm for Finding All Vertices of Convex Polyhedral Sets. Mathematicians
have always been interested in finding good algorithms, that is, descriptions which
calculations have to be executed in order to solve a problem. After World War II, the
advent of computers gave rise to a renewed interest in algorithms, and in particular
those algorithms that are suitable for machine calculations.
The type of problems that are exceptionally well suited to be handled by a machine
came to be known under the name of linear programs. Balinski’s dissertation dealt
with particular geometric structures that submit themselves to this approach, convex
polyhedral sets (Vielecke), whose shape is determined by flat sides meeting in straight
line edges, and edges meeting in vertices, Eckpunkten. Any such set can be described
from an internal, primal point of view, or alternatively, from an external, dual view
point. Just as we can describe this lecture hall by looking to the walls from the inside
where we are now – which is the primal approach to the problem, or else by walking
around on the outside and tell what we see then – the dual approach. At times the
dual approach is quite persuasive, just think of the drinks that may be waiting outside.
However, Balinski approached the problem more from an academic point of view and,
together with his Doktorvater Al Tucker, published a long article on the Duality Theory
of Linear Programs in the 1969 SIAM Review.
Another important subclass of problems are those, where the vertices of the convex
bodies (konvexe Ko¨rper) have integer coordinates (ganzzahlige Koordinaten). Balinski
was one of the first to extend the theory to such models. Nowadays there are many
textbooks devoted to this type of problem, but in 1965 there was none. The subject was
new, and Balinski’s seventy-page 1965 overview article served as a welcome reference
and first textbook for the new field. The article enjoyed the fate, rather rare in
mathematics, of being reprinted twice, in 1968 and in 1970.
Another subset of combinatorial results comes under the inviting name of stable
marriage theorems (stabile Heiratssa¨tze), proving by terminology better than by
anything else that mathematics is so utterly anwendungsorientiert. The problem is
standard. There is a set of ladies and a set of men. Each lady likes certain of the men
and has her preferences among them, but detest the others. Similarly, each men has
his preferences among the women he likes, but cares not a whit about the others. The
mathematical question is this: Can men and women be happily married given their
respective preferences?
Imagine what could go wrong if Monika and Friedrich, say, were married to others,
and yet, Monika preferred him to her current mate, while at the same time Friedrich
preferred Monika over his current mate. They would be unhappy and, provided the two
couples meet too often, they would abandon their current mates for each other. Though
I grant that marriage is a very serious business, it is a peculiar trait of mathematicians
to go to the simplest possible situation that reveals the essence of a problem, however
frivilous it may sound. There are also polyandrous versions of the question, where
every lady may have several husbands, and polygamous versions, starring men with
many wives.
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Are there marriages which would avoid the sad instability of our example? The
mathematical theorem answers: Yes, there always are! Of course, the mathematical
results are independent of the narrative frame in which they are presented. There
are important practical problems submitting themselves to just the same analysis:
admitting students to universities, appointing candidates to jobs, or allocating hours
of work on different tasks to workers of different qualifications. All these instances come
under what now is called “two-sided markets”, for which the mathematical approach
provides a vital aid how to match, allocate, or apportion resources. As with other
problems, mathematics focusses on two issues: Can it be done at all and, if so, how to
do it efficiently. Balinski and co-authors have contributed considerably to the realm
of marriage theorems and, in a recent 2003 American Mathematical Monthly note
exemplify its usefulness for Admissions and Recruitment.
Contributions to discrete model building
Problems of matching and allocation, as just outlined, are categorized as discrete
mathematics. The attribute “discrete” is used for the very reason why we term
a person discrete, as somebody who honors the individual, who acknowledges that
there are features peculiar to an individual rather than being shared by many, as
somebody who refrains from generalizing inappropriately. In social life the opposite
is indiscretion. In mathematics, however, the opposite of discrete mathematics is
continuous mathematics.
Discrete mathematics counts items; it rules out continuous transitions from one to the
other. Each candidate stands for herself or himself, each institution is recognized
as a unit on its own, each seat in parliament is honored as a valuable entity by
itself. Such constructs as fractional candidates, or fractional institutions, or fractional
seats in parliament are meaningless. The friction between mathematical terms and
practical needs becomes particularly apparent in consulting, when the – mathematical
– consultant wants to persuade the – non-mathematical – consultee of the usefulness
of the approach. While model building itself may be more of an art than a science, the
mathematical problems thereby generated are abundant, and challenging.
Michel Balinski’s experience to apply abstract mathematical concepts to concrete
problems of economics and decision making is based on an impressive experience as
a mathematical consultant, for such companies as de Borden Mills Inc., the RAND
Corporation, Mathematica Inc., Mobile Oil Research Laboratories, ORTF, Econ Inc.,
and others. His pointed opinions on where mathematics can contribute to the solution
of practical problems is all too noticeable throughout his technical papers, be it
matching problems as covered by the type of marriage theorems mentioned above, or
problems of assignment, allocation, or apportionment. As a third group of examples,
I would like to finally turn to his work on apportionment methods for proportional
representation.
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Contributions to the analysis of proportional representation systems
Balinski’s research into the mathematics of apportionment and proportional represen-
tation originates from the early 70’s, much of it together with his junior co-author
Peyton Young. The collaboration of the two culminated in the 1982 monograph on
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. The first edition from
Yale University Press was followed by a 1987 Japanese translation and, in 2001, by a
second edition whose pagination is identical with that of the first edition. The book
centers around the apportionment problem as it manifests itself for the US-American
House of Representatives. There the issue is to apportion (zuteilen) the 435 house
seats among the 50 States of the Union, proportionally to the population counts of the
decennial census data.
Of course, parliamentary seats are in the first place more of a political than of a
mathematical nature. However, when one of the seats was contested in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court found it appropriate to include in the decision a six-
page review of the Balinski/Young monograph. I would bet that theirs is the only
mathematics book that ever got read and reviewed by any supreme court throughout
the world. The judges, while not questioning the mathematical correctness of the book,
did improve on its political correctness, by turning the untimely Balinski/Young motto
of “one man, one vote” into the more equal principle of “one person, one vote”. It
may have escaped their attention that, in mathematics and statistics, the data unit
“man” refers to what in the old days the great Latin writers would have worded as
“homo”, and not as “vir”. As down-to-earth scientists we would never set up a theory
that visibly excludes half of mankind, or politically more correct, half of personkind.
The Balinski/Young Fair representation work is actually two books in one. The first
half carefully reviews the historical experience that accumulated over more than 200
years of US history. I find these first hundred pages a gem of scientific writing, always
lucid, occasionally thrilling, and at times entertaining. The authors aim, and succeed,
in extracting from the historical experience general rules which, in mathematical
language, may serve as an axiomatic foundation of a theory of apportionment, which
then is laid out in the second half of the book.
For instance, one such axiom demands that changes in representation agree with
changes in population. If, relative to several competing groups, one is growing larger,
then the number of its representatives should increase. But does it? Not in the system
that we use for the election of the Deutschen Bundestag where, weird as it may sound,
more Zweitstimmen votes for a party may result in fewer Bundestag seats.
Another axiom stipulates that a parliamentary body that grows in size will never see
a party shrink in its number of representatives. But does it? Not in Germany. When,
in 1989, the steering committee of the Wetteraukreis in Hessen was formed, the two
major parties raised the number of seats from nine to ten. Why? Because this made
one of the minor parties drop from one representative to none. That is, not only was
a new seat created by enlarging the committee size from nine to ten, but, due to the
pecularities of the apportionment method used, an old seat was taken away from an
unwanted competitor who was thereby pushed out. Not surprisingly, the two seats
thus generated benefitted the two major parties.
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Laying down general principles, or axioms as we say in mathematics, enables us to
classify the many methods that are available to convert population or vote counts
into numbers of representatives. These mathematical classifications are carried out in
the second half of the Balinski/Young monograph, where the authors scrutinize the
apportionment methods that are in use all over the world against the general axioms
that appear so compelling and hard to deny.
Michel Balinski pursued the subject into many different directions. One of them
includes biproportional representation methods, wherein proportionality is achieved
in two directions, one along the regional subdivision of the population, the other,
along party lines. I had the privilege of proposing one such biproportional method to
the Kantonsrat Zu¨rich who, in fact, adopted it almost unanimously to include it in
their new electoral law.
Another line of Balinski’s research aims at the districting problem, that is, achieving
electoral equality in electoral districts (Wahlkreise, Stimmkreise). We will hear more
about this problem in a minute or two from Professor Balinski himself.
I have subsumed Michel Balinski’s research work under the Augsburg standard of
Anwendungsorientiertheit, and I would like to end by drawing your attention to
another point of what Anwendungsorientiertheit includes. Namely, proliferating the
mathematical findings, not only as technical papers in academic journals, but also as
nontechnical articles in the public science press. Who otherwise would publicize the
findings, if not those who generate them? You will not be surprised to hear that Michel
Balinski has done so, in Le Monde, Pour la science, Spektrum der Wissenschaft and
other press products.
Naturally it always remains a challenge to translate dry academic truths into juicy
public stories, and a welcome trick is to embellish the presentation by drawing on
quotes from literary and intellectual authorities. If my laudatio were in German I
certainly would have taken recourse to Goethe and Schiller. As it is in English, I have
to switch to the British G&S-counterpart, Gilbert and Sullivan, and end with a three-
liner quoted by Professor Balinski in order to dismiss any doubt that his proposed
mechanism for a stable marriage assignment is optimal. As for me, the quote is
to imply that the mechanism of the Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Universita¨t Augsburg to nominate their PhD laureates is – doubtlessly – equally
optimal:
Of that there is no matter of doubt–
No probable, possible, shadow of doubt–
No possible doubt whatever.
(Gilbert and Sullivan, The Gondoliers)
